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VPFMeasurement of an economic good by opinion survey constitutes a variant of the political opinion polls
widely familiar from news reporting. The paper relates the minimum sample size needed for the survey
measurement of a wealth-dependent parameter to the smallest sample for a political poll giving the same
precision. Measuring a strongly wealth-dependent parameter by survey requires a sample size of 2000
or more to provide precision equivalent to the 3% margin of error customary in UK political opinion polls.
It is shown that the survey measurement of the ‘‘value of a prevented fatality” (VPF) used in the UK as a
health and safety spending yardstick requires 3000 people to be questioned. The analysis shows the
actual sample size used, 167, to be inadequate. This adds to the problems besetting the UK VPF, as the
method the surveyors used to interpret their data has already been shown invalid.
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Measurement history in the social sciences
It is widely acknowledged that metrology has played an enor-
mous role in the development of the physical sciences that have
seen such success over the last 150 years. Less well appreciated
is the fact that measurement has been applied to commerce since
the earliest days of man’s civilisation [1,2]. Furthermore, increasing
attention is now being paid to the processes by which human attri-
butes such as perceptions, judgements and valuations might be
measured. There can be no doubt, however, that measuring the
properties or attributes of human behaviour is a difficult task.
The economist Edward Glaeser argues [3] that the social
sciences are still young, claiming:
‘‘The widespread application of scientific methods to the study
of human society—rigorous formal theories, serious empirical
testing—occurred only during the twentieth century, mostly
since World War II.”
He highlights the work of ‘‘great measurers” of the 20th century
such as the economist Simon Kuznets, whose economic tradition
he expects will continue to expand in the coming decades. Kuznetsstressed that reliable results can be derived only through large
numbers of observations and his Nobel prize winning work in eco-
nomics provided the key to measuring gross national product [4,5].
The need for large numbers of observations will be a theme to
which this paper will return.
But measurement on a large scale in the field of social science
dates back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century, when
the first public examinations for schools were introduced in the
United Kingdom. The move was in response to a demand for some
way of judging pupils’ levels of attainment [6] and in 1858, the
University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate set and
marked papers for school students under the ages of 16 and 18
over a wide range of topics. The subjects were similar to those
examined today: English Language and Literature, History, Geogra-
phy, Geology, Greek, Latin, French, German, Political Economy and
English Law, Mathematics, Arithmetic, Chemistry, Physical
Sciences, Zoology, Drawing, Music and Religious Knowledge. The
issues involved in measuring proficiency from the answers to
graded questions have been the subject of a number recent
research studies [7,8]. Meanwhile a good summary of the historical
development of measurement thinking since the 1930s for more
general psychological attributes is given in [9]. Deriving from the
success of measurement in the physical sciences, a philosophical
and theoretical basis was developed for the universal process of
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measurement system [11] has been put forward recently.
The need to determine what can and cannot be claimed for
measurements in the social sciences has stimulated the re-
examination of the principles of metrology. Stevens made a nota-
ble contribution just after the Second World War [12] by analysing
scales of measurement and classifying them as nominal, ordinal,
interval and ratio. The ratio scale is the most comprehensive of
these, in the sense that it can accommodate the four important
quantitative relations: equality, rank-order, equality of intervals
and equality of ratios. At about the same time, von Neumann and
Morgenstern [13] examined the principles of measurement in rela-
tion to the concept of utility widely used in economics then and
now. They concluded that utility could be claimed correct to a pos-
itive linear transformation – Stevens’s interval scale. Subsequently
Thomas [14,15] was able to build on this work by including the
notions concerning utility introduced by Pratt [16] and Atkinson
[17] to show that a ratio scale for utility against wealth can be con-
structed, with risk-aversion as parameter.
Schley and Peters [18] have proposed that an individual’s risk-
aversion is influenced by the subject’s imprecise perception of
numerical magnitudes: ‘‘inexact mappings of symbolic numbers
onto mental magnitudes”. Differences in the curvatures of people’s
utility functions can then be explained, at least in part, by differing
levels of numerical acuity. Those with higher powers of numerical
discrimination display an effective risk-aversion that is lower than
those with a less well developed ability to distinguish between
numbers of a similar but different magnitude. Meanwhile, different
situations call for different risk-aversions. Thomas and Chrystal
[19] suggest that a consumer will be open to quantity retail promo-
tions such as ‘‘buy one get one free” provided his/her risk-aversion
lies between 0 and 1. When commodities such as eggs are sold in
different pack sizes, satisfying the desires of the average cautious
consumer (risk-aversion = 0.5) will then result in a ratio of succes-
sive pack sizes equal to the square of the golden ratio, namely 2.62,
while the price-ratio will be the golden ratio, 1.62. The ‘‘three for
the price of two” promotion (where, for example, 18 eggs are
offered for the price of 2 half- dozen packs) emerges as a reason-
ably close approximation, with an implied risk-aversion of 0.37.
Thomas [15] laid out the challenge of measuring risk-aversion,
an important parameter lying squarely in the field of social science,
at the interface between psychology and economics. Further pro-
gress was made when it was shown recently that this psycho-
economic property can be measured empirically for decisions on
life extension using data collected from the lives of billions of peo-
ple throughout the world [20]. See also [21]. The measurement
became possible as the result of the application of a new theory,
the J-value [22,23], to decisions on extending life. The study by
Thomas and Waddington utilised the results of the continuing
‘‘natural experiment” that is taking place in all societies at all times
to find the optimal trade-off between promoting longer life (for
example through better public health, enhanced health care and
improved industrial protection) and the resources that people are
prepared to devote to the task, under the constraint that different
nations have different levels of resource.
1.2. Problems facing measurement by survey
Subjectivity and bias are two obvious hazards lying in wait for
those attempting measurements in non-physical fields. Finkelstein
[2] suggests that the observers/analysts in social sciences may well
not be objective, but operate ‘‘on the basis of ideologically
motivated theories”. Mari et al. [24] follow Karl Popper [25] in
regarding objectivity and inter-subjective testability as the critical
features for the reliability and dependability of physical andnon-physical measurements. Transgressions against those pre-
cepts can arise in one particular method of measurement used
extensively in the social sciences, namely an opinion survey, by
which the consolidated view of the wider population is sought
by questioning only a sample. The intention is usually to measure
a subjective parameter, and this may bring its own problems, as
discussed later.
The important concept of the ‘‘person as a measuring instru-
ment” is introduced by Rossi and Berglund [9] in the context of
human perceptions of smell, who propose that ‘‘the screening
and testing of participants, as measuring instruments, are prereq-
uisites for reliable and valid psychological measurement”. An
example would be the wine tasters employed in wineries and
restaurants, who, by nature and experience, have developed more
sophisticated and discerning palates than the average person and
are therefore able to pass a more expert verdict. Their judgements
will influence the market into which a particular wine is sold, as
well as its price. The wine-tasting process might be automated
eventually, perhaps using a version of the electronic nose discussed
in [9], possibly acting in conjunction with analytic chemical
instrumentation.
After ‘‘sentencing” by the experts, the wine will subsequently
be tasted by many people, and each will make his or her own eval-
uation of it. It is important to note that, in this case, each person
will be making a measurement of the same thing, namely the qual-
ities of the wine in question. However, this contrasts strongly with
many survey measurements made in the socio-politico arena,
where the person is certainly the measuring instrument, but what
is being measured is not common to all but is, instead, unique to
the person.
For example, by the theory of the utility model for the value of a
prevented fatality (VPF) (see Section 3.1 for details), the individual
is required to possess a maximum acceptable price (MAP) that he
or she is prepared to pay to avert an injury and a minimum accept-
able compensation level (MAC) that he/she is prepared to accept to
make up for receiving that injury. It should be noted that the MAP
and the MAC are specific to the individual and cannot be regarded
as the individual’s subjective measurement of a feature which the
other respondents have access to and can measure. In these sur-
veys, there is no better expert on the opinion of the individual than
the individual himself/herself. Moreover, screening out individuals
in such a case is not justified unless it can be proved in advance
that the person is not qualified to offer an opinion, for example
by reason of insanity or through being too young to have acquired
the necessary experience (e.g. being below voting age). There is no
correct view in such a survey, and in an open and civilised society,
there should be no discrimination in favour of certain, selected
opinions. It is with such surveys that the present paper is
concerned.
The least problematic and simplest of such surveys is probably
the political opinion poll conducted among adults qualified to vote.
This is because in a democracy, the respondent has exclusive con-
trol of his or her opinion, which he or she may later convert into a
vote. But even here the process of conversion from opinion to vote
is not straightforward. For example, the person’s view can change
between the date of the survey and the date of the election, and, of
course, the person may not vote on the day, either through choice
or circumstance. Moreover, the respondent may not want to
divulge his/her true opinion to the pollster and may instead
express a view calculated to avoid the interviewer’s presumed
censure.
It is obvious that, as a minimum, the subjective opinions of the
surveyor should not be allowed to affect the result of the political
opinion survey. There are two correctives against this. In the first
instance, it is unlikely in a free and competitive society that there
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immediate check on results will be at hand. Moreover there will
eventually be a definitive check when the result of the official bal-
lot becomes known. But it is important to realise that such checks
and balances may well be absent in surveys beyond the political
arena, and this increases the requirement for the highest levels
of impartiality among surveyors and analysts.
The need to avoid analysts’ opinions encroaching on the results
of their opinion surveys led to the development in 2014 of the new
criterion of Structural View Independence [26]. The mathematics
prove that it is possible for the analyst to select in advance a plau-
sible method to consolidate the survey results into a single figure
so that the final value is guaranteed to be biased either low or high.
For example, the geometric mean will always produce a figure that
is too low, while the root-mean-square value will always give a
value that is too high. These are instances where a general nonlin-
ear, increasing and differentiable transformation is applied, then
the mean found for the transformed sample and finally the result
back-transformed to give the consolidated figure. Structural View
Independence requires the study to be structured to ensure that
the weighting given to each person’s opinion is independent of
its content. Only in this way can the views of all respondents be
accorded the equal treatment they deserve. Out of all the trans-
forms considered, this criterion is satisfied only by linear transfor-
mations. This implies that the consolidated view should be found
simply by taking the arithmetic average. In one important case, a
team of surveyors employed a further, non-differentiable trans-
form to interpret opinion surveys, and the results were used to jus-
tify reducing the spending against multi-fatality accidents on the
UK’s railways by a factor of three. However it was shown in [27]
that this new transformation discriminated systematically in
favour of low valuations (and hence low spendings) and thus vio-
lated the principle of Structural View Independence. This meant
that it was unsafe to make use of the survey results.
It is obvious from the discussion above that there are significant
pitfalls associated with the application of opinion surveys for gen-
eral parameter estimation. Even so they are often used in eco-
nomics to put a value on public goods, such as clean air or the
continued survival of a rare species of plant or animal.
It is generally accepted [28] that the ways to measure the value
of any good are, in order of preference:
1. the market value if a free market in the good exists – this is the
best way
2. the value deduced from revealed preferences, in line with John
Locke’s dictum ‘‘I have always thought the actions of men the
best interpreters of their thoughts” [29]
3. the value deduced from stated preferences, typically from opin-
ion surveys – where Fujiwara and Campbell [30] have uttered
the reservation: ‘‘respondents in stated preference surveys
may have an incentive to deliberately misrepresent their true
preferences in order to achieve a more desirable outcome for
themselves . . . individuals may overstate their valuations of
the good if they believe their responses influence its provision
and are unrelated to the price they will be charged for it”.
It is when methods 1 and 2 prove either impossible or very dif-
ficult to arrange that option 3 is sometimes chosen.
As a minimum the criterion of Structural View Independence
needs to be satisfied if an opinion survey is to be used as a mea-
surement tool. It is equally clear that the most rigorous standards
must be applied to the task of statistical inference if the survey
results are to have meaning. Even then, of course, the Fujiwara
and Campbell caveat suggests that that high accuracy cannot be
expected.1.3. Survey measurement of the ‘‘value of a prevented fatality”
The present author has highlighted a number of instances of
poor practice in survey measurements, where lack of rigour has
had notable adverse implications [31]. One ethically significant
and practically important case concerns the measurement of the
UK Government’s ‘‘value of a prevented fatality” (VPF). This is
defined as the maximum amount that it is notionally reasonable
to pay for a safety measure that will reduce by one the expected
number of preventable premature deaths in a large population.
But it is pointed out in [32] that the VPF constitutes only a crude
estimate of what is lost when someone is deprived of his or her life.
For example, an 18 year-old generally has many more years of life
ahead than a 78 year-old. Moreover, the UK VPF, which is based on
an opinion survey carried out over 20 years ago [33], has been
shown to contain major flaws as a result of the use of an invalid
method of interpreting its survey evidence [34].
The success in validating the J-value method against pan-
national data [20] enables the statement to be made that the UK
VPF in current use, £1.83M (2016 £s), is 4 to 5 times below what
would be reasonable. To the extent that the concept has validity,
the VPF should lie a lot closer to the equivalent figure announced
by the U.S. Department for Transportation in 2016, namely
$9.6M, based on stated preference studies [35]. Using J-value anal-
ysis for valuing human life, the VPF, now interpreted as the amount
that should be spent to preserve the life expectancy of the average
person in the UK, ought to be £8.59M (2015 £s). The clear disparity
between this figure and that still used by the UK Government has
obvious, negative implications for the priority being assigned to
the safety of UK citizens.
Although the research team responsible for the VPF survey
made two attempts to defend its interpretation method, [36,37],
the team’s defence was refuted in detail [38,39]. See also [40] for
a review of the multiple flaws besetting the UK VPF and [41] for
a demonstration of the lack of justification for the surveyors reject-
ing their initial survey, which would have produced a much higher
figure [42].
It has been pointed previously that the validity of a survey esti-
mate for the VPF ‘‘rests critically on the sample population reflect-
ing closely the probability density for wealth of the target
population as a whole” (last paragraph of Appendix A.5 of [34]).
But the average wealth of the participants in the Carthy survey
may be calculated using the surveyors’ own method as between
£3568 and £7136, less than 10% of the average net wealth of UK
adults at the time of the survey.
A further factor contributing to the glaring mismatch between
the apparently low levels of wealth amongst the respondents and
the much higher figures in the UK population as a whole might
well be the small sample size used in the VPF survey: just 167
people.
The important general question is raised: what is the minimum
sample size needed to measure a wealth-dependent economic
parameter by opinion survey? In addressing this issue, the well
documented case of the survey measurement of the VPF is used
as an exemplar. Such a survey is a variant of the political opinion
polls widely familiar from news reporting. A significant difference
is that the measurement of the economic good usually involves the
characterisation of people’s choices from a continuum rather than
from two or more discrete options.
1.4. Structure of the paper
This section has provided a brief review of the history of mea-
surement in the social sciences, of the difficulties encountered in
using surveys as measurement tools and of some the problems that
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vented fatality” (VPF).
New data on the distribution of personal wealth in the UK allow
an assessment to be made, in Section 2, of the challenge to the
measurement of a wealth-dependent parameter that is posed by
the very great variation in wealth across a developed country such
as the United Kingdom. Section 3 develops two diverse models for
the survey measurement of the VPF: the Utility Model and the
Multiplier Model.
In Section 4, the smallest sample size needed to guarantee a
specified precision in a political opinion poll is established using
the DeMoivre-Laplace Limit Theorem. This is then related via the
Central Limit Theorem to the lowest number of people required
in a survey measurement of a wealth-dependent parameter at
the same precision. A degenerate lower limit is found for the ratio
of the VPF minimum sample size to that of a political opinion poll
at the same level of precision. This limiting ‘‘numbers ratio” is
found to be the same under both models for the VPF survey.
Section 5 contains the discussion and Section 6 the conclusions.
Appendix A derives the mean and variance when data for cumu-
lative probability are given in tabular form. Appendix B introduces
the DeMoivre-Laplace Limit Theorem to explain the margin of
error used in political opinion polls. Appendix C sets out how, for
an opinion poll, the confidence interval results from a minimisa-
tion procedure applied to the interval containing the population
average. Appendix D introduces the Central Limit Theorem as a
generalisation of the DeMoivre-Laplace theorem and explains the
derivation of a confidence interval for the population average of
a continuous parameter.
The final Appendix E, details how a random multiplier may be
incorporated into the Utility Model to produce the Extended Utility
Model, thereby allowing for the likely variation in stated personal
VPF amongst individuals with similar personal wealth.2. The challenge of measuring a wealth-dependent parameter
by survey
Figures from the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) show
people’s wealth varies over a very wide range [43]. While a small
fraction, between 1% and 2%, of UK households have negative
assets, the richest person in Britain is said to be worth £21bn
[44]. Other developed countries are likely to exhibit similarly large
variations in the individual assets of their citizens.
Approximate values for individual wealth percentiles may be
found by dividing the household wealth percentiles provided by
the Office of National Statistics (Fig. 3 of [43]) by the average num-
ber of people per household, namely 2.4 [45]. See Table 1 below. A
small fraction (<2%) of the UK population was living with the bur-
den of net debt in 2014–2016, but the average personal wealth was
£198,112 (a figure found by dividing the ONS figure for total
wealth, £12.8 tn, by the 2014 UK population of 64.6M). Meanwhile,
slightly more than 10% of UK citizens had assets of £0.5M or above,
and more than 1 in 50 were millionaires. The cumulative probabil-
ity for individual wealth in the UK is illustrated in Fig. 1, while
Fig. 2 gives the probability density for wealth in the UK in 2014–
2016. The irregularity of the probability density is striking, show-
ing a very considerable variation within small ranges as well as
over the full span.
The starting wealth in Table 1 (a debt of £4933) is found by
extrapolation from the ONS data. The final point is estimated after
assuming that the probability density is uniform between per-
centiles, as in Appendix A. Using Eq. (A.5), £1,796,407 emerges as
the necessary balancing wealth needed to ensure that the average
wealth from Table 1 matches the figure of £198,112 calculated in
the last paragraph. This provides an approximate match to therising trend observed in the preceding percentiles (Fig. 3). Of
course, given the £21 bn of wealth ascribed to one UK citizen and
the number of other known billionaires in the population, the lim-
iting wealth is clearly a notional figure only. Its relatively low
value, less than £2M, suggests that the variance on wealth will
be understated as a result.
Even so, the great variation in wealth across the nation remains
evident, and this poses a significant challenge to those hoping to
measure, by opinion survey, the average of a wealth-dependent
parameter. To put the challenge in context, the ONS felt it neces-
sary in their wealth survey to set the size of their sample at
18,000. This sample size is very much higher than those used in
most political opinion polls, for example, which tend to be in the
low thousands.
The paper will examine the VPF as an exemplar of a continuous
parameter that is strongly conditioned by the wealth of the indi-
vidual making the response.3. Models for a survey measurement of the VPF
This Section will derive two possible mathematical models of
the survey measurement of the VPF. The first of these will provide
a justification for the assumption that an individual’s personal VPF
is heavily dependent on his or her wealth. The second provides a
general, and hence transferable, representation of a parameter that
is strongly wealth dependent.
3.1. Utility Model of VPF survey
The first approach accords with that presented by Carthy et al.
[33] as analysed by Thomas and Vaughan (Appendix A of [34]).
Under this model the person will be prepared to sacrifice some
of his/her wealth to avoid injury as long as his/her expected utility
stays constant.
Let wi be the starting wealth of the ith individual and Ui wið Þ be
his/her utility of wealth when he/she is in good health. Now con-
sider an injury, k, that is assumed to reduce the individual’s utility
of wealth to Iki wið Þ. Let the new utility be a fraction, cki, of the per-
son’s utility of wealth when in good health:
Iki wið Þ ¼ ckiUi wið Þ 0  cki < 1 ð1Þ
(This equation, attributed to Viscusi and Evans [46], differs from
the form, Iki wið Þ ¼ Ui wið Þ  aki; aki  0, proposed by Carthy et al.
[33], but those later authors clearly regarded it as a legitimate
alternative (see Note 5 of [33]).)
Now suppose that, over some period of time, an individual faces
two mutually exclusive possibilities: (i) he/she may incur injury k,
with probability qk, or (ii) he/she may continue in full health. (The
simplifying assumption is made that the probability of death from
causes other than the specified injury is negligible.) The individ-
ual’s utility of wealth will now depend on whether or not the
injury occurs and hence will be a random variable, Zi wið Þ, with
an expected value, zi, given by:
zi ¼ E Zi wið Þ½  ¼ 1 qkð ÞUi wið Þ þ qkIki wið Þ ð2Þ
It may be possible for the individual to reduce the probability,
qk, of injury, k, over some period by expending money on protec-
tion, leading to a fall in his/her wealth. Alternatively, he/she might
accept a higher injury probability but receive compensation, with
the result that his/her wealth, wi, rises. Thus changes to qk will
be accompanied by related changes in wi, and the limiting condi-
tion occurs when the expected utility stays the same, viz. zi = con-
stant, which implies that @zi=@qk ¼ 0.
Carrying out the necessary partial differentiation of Eq. (2) with
respect to qk and setting the result to zero gives the rate of change,
Table 1
Cumulative probability distribution for individual wealth, FW wð Þ, for the UK, 2014–2016.
w (£) FW wð Þ w (£) FW wð Þ w (£) FW wð Þ w (£) FW wð Þ
4933 0.00 25,402 0.25 108,096 0.5 260,520 0.75
2137 0.01 27,482 0.26 112,412 0.51 269,062 0.76
658 0.02 29,889 0.27 116,835 0.52 279,520 0.77
1050 0.03 32,974 0.28 120,940 0.53 291,118 0.78
1333 0.04 35,949 0.29 125,008 0.54 303,333 0.79
2267 0.05 38,738 0.3 129,792 0.55 315,170 0.8
3042 0.06 41,858 0.31 134,703 0.56 330,509 0.81
3248 0.07 44,794 0.32 139,167 0.57 345,549 0.82
3714 0.08 47,837 0.33 143,842 0.58 361,657 0.83
4586 0.09 50,981 0.34 149,035 0.59 377,527 0.84
5668 0.1 54,125 0.35 153,799 0.6 394,168 0.85
6285 0.11 57,013 0.36 158,626 0.61 411,060 0.86
6638 0.12 60,240 0.37 163,713 0.62 431,554 0.87
7296 0.13 63,875 0.38 169,613 0.63 452,598 0.88
8291 0.14 67,032 0.39 175,092 0.64 476,581 0.89
9625 0.15 70,330 0.4 181,418 0.65 504,161 0.9
10,562 0.16 73,996 0.41 187,830 0.66 536,670 0.91
11,679 0.17 77,729 0.42 195,053 0.67 571,766 0.92
13,410 0.18 81,223 0.43 202,605 0.68 607,089 0.93
14,637 0.19 85,021 0.44 210,753 0.69 654,886 0.94
15,813 0.2 88,275 0.45 219,920 0.7 709,013 0.95
17,708 0.21 91,854 0.46 227,864 0.71 780,563 0.96
19,513 0.22 95,579 0.47 236,014 0.72 881,842 0.97
21,394 0.23 99,358 0.48 242,878 0.73 1,021,726 0.98
23,259 0.24 103,307 0.49 251,503 0.74 1,336,894 0.99
1,796,407 1.00
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Fig. 1. UK individual wealth, 2014–2016.
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Fig. 2. Probability density for individual wealth in the UK, 2014–2016. (Note the
logarithmic scale for the horizontal axis, required to allow discrimination at lower levels
of wealth.)
0.0E+00
5.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.5E+06
2.0E+06
90 92 94 96 98 100
Cumulative percentage
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ea
lth
 (£
)
Fig. 3. Calculated individual wealth percentiles.
P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044 5@wi=@qk, of wealth, wi, with the probability, qk, of injury k, for a
constant expected utility
@zi
@qk
¼ 1 qkð Þ
dUi
dwi
þ qk
dIki
dwi
 
@wi
@qk
þ Iki  Ui ¼ 0 ð3Þ
Now the probability, pk, of not receiving injury k is pk ¼ 1 qk, so
that dpk=dqk ¼ 1 and @wi=@pk ¼ @wi=@qk. It is reasonable to
assume that a person would be prepared to trade some of his/her
wealth,wi, for a higher probability of not receiving injury k.An indif-
ference curve should then exist,where the person’s utility stays con-
stant. The expression, @wi=@pkjzi¼const, quantifies the trade-off at a
general point, pk;wið Þ, on the indifference curve:wealth is decreased
by a positive small amount, dwi, from wi to wi  dwi in order that
non-injury probability, pk, should increase to pk þ dpk, where dpk is
small and positive. The negative of the partial differential of wealth
with respect to non-injury probabilitymay be described as themar-
ginal rate of substitution, mki, of non-injury probability, pk, in place
of wealth, wi: mki ¼ @wi=@pkjzi¼const. Since @wi=@pk ¼ @wi=@qk, it
follows that
mki ¼ @wi
@qk

zi¼const
¼ Ui wið Þ  Iki wið Þ
1 qkð Þ dUidwi þ qk
dIki
dwi
¼ 1 ckið ÞUi wið Þ
1 qk 1 ckið Þð Þ dUidwi
ð4Þ
6 P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044It is argued in [14,15] that only utility functions from the Power
family can be true descriptions of human experience. Hence the
utility of wealth may be written:
Ui wið Þ ¼ ai
w1e
i
1
1e for e–1
ailnwi for e ¼ 1
(
ð5Þ
where e is risk-aversion and a constant. ai is also a constant, con-
forming with the ideas of von Neumann and Morgenstern [13]
and the clarification brought out in [14,15] that the Power utility
formulation of Eq. (5) gives the utility relative to the utility of one
unit of wealth, thus producing a ratio scale for utility of wealth.
Differentiating equation pair (5) with respect to wealth gives:
dUi
dwi
¼ ai
we
for all e ð6Þ
Thus, substituting from Eqs. (5) and (6) into Eq. (4) gives:
mki ¼
1cki
1qk 1ckið Þ
wiwei
1e for e–1
1cki
1qk 1ckið Þwilnwi for e ¼ 1
8<
: ð7Þ
Now let k denote a fatal injury, in which casemki ¼ mDi ¼ v i, the
marginal rate of substitution of non-death probability in place of
wealth, which is individual i’s personal VPF:
v i ¼
1cDi
1qD 1cDið Þ
wiwei
1e for e–1
1cDi
1qD 1cDið Þwilnwi for e ¼ 1
8<
: ð8Þ
Eq. (8) is dependent both on both the individual’s fractional
loss, 1 cDi, of utility through dying prematurely and on the prob-
ability of being killed, qD. However, we may judge that that nearly
all utility is lost on death for the average person, so that cDi ! 0.
Presumably cDi will attain exactly that figure for an individual
without close relatives and uninterested in charitable giving.
Moreover in many cases, for example when an improvement is
being considered for an industrial protection system, the probabil-
ity of death is already low: qD << 1. Hence equation set (8) may be
approximated by:
v i 
wiwei
1e for e–1
wilnwi for e ¼ 1
(
ð9Þ
A significant failing of the model just presented is the lack of
any dependence on age even though what is at stake for a typical
young person is patently very different from that for an elderly
individual – the VPF values the life of a 20 year-old with 61 years’
expected life the same as that of a 90 year-old with about 4 years
of life expectancy. This reflects a major philosophical weakness
in the VPF concept, as been pointed out previously by Sunstein
[47] as well as Thomas and Vaughan [32].
By the theory just presented, and from Eq. (9) in particular, the
individual’s VPF is determined entirely by his or her wealth as soon
as the risk-aversion, e, is specified, and randomness is introduced
only by the process of selecting a person from the population.
The absence of variation in stated VPFs amongst people with the
same wealth is clearly a simplification that will reduce the variance
predicted by the model. (This issue is explored in Appendix E.)
A table of percentiles for the VPF may be built up by applying
equation set (9) to the percentiles of wealth given in Table 1. The
methods of Appendix A may then be applied to find the population
average VPF and the variance of personal VPF.
The first two percentiles of wealth are negative, which poses a
problem in computing the corresponding figures for VPF from Eq.
(9). Two potential ways forward may be considered. In the first,
wij j and wij je are substituted in place of wi and wei respectively in
Eq. (9) and the utility of negative wealth is calculated as a negativemultiple, a : a  2, of the result. This takes up the notion, intro-
duced by Kahneman and Tversky [48] and discussed further in
[49], that the disutility of a debit is numerically greater than the
utility of the same sum in credit. Hence
v i ¼ wij j
e a wij j1e11e for e–1; i ¼ 1;2
wij j  aln wij j for e ¼ 1; i ¼ 1;2
(
ð10Þ
which produces negative values for v1 and v2. The other approach is
simply to set v1 ¼ v2 ¼ 0. In fact it matters little which of these
methods is used, as the changes in calculated values for lV and
r2V are reflected only in the 4th significant figure. Hence it is reason-
able to choose the simpler second option. Such a course avoids the
awkward implication that those in debt will regard death as a finan-
cially attractive option, although it can still be inferred that they
regard death as financially neutral.
The validation of the J-value method [20] means that it is pos-
sible to find a good estimate of the value to be placed on the aver-
age life to come for UK citizens. Carrying out this exercise for
actuarial and GDP data for 2015 gives a figure of £8,587,700. Tak-
ing this to be the actual value of the VPF, an implied value for emay
be found, namely that which causes the expected value, E Vð Þ, to
coincide with this figure. E Vð Þmay be found by calculating the per-
sonal VPF, v i, for each wealth, wi, listed in Table 1 and applying Eq.
(A.5) from Appendix A. The risk-aversion is then varied to give a
match, which occurs at a risk-aversion of e ¼ 1:1605. Thus the
deduced value for risk-aversion lies in the second quartile of the
range, 1  e  1:5, currently advocated in the UK Treasury’s Green
Book [50]. It conforms also to the Treasury’s previous advice in its
Green Book, namely that e was likely to be just below or just above
unity [51].
Applying Eq. (A.9) with Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) of Appendix A, and
putting X ¼ V ; xi ¼ v i and n = 100, allows the variance, r2V , to be
found. Eq. (11) summarises the key figures coming from the Utility
Model:
lV ¼ £8;587;700
r2V ¼ 1:8299 1014
rV ¼ £13;527;463
ð11Þ3.2. Multiplier Model of VPF survey
An alternate model assumes that the individual’s stated VPF is
some multiple, R, of his/her wealth: the ‘‘Multiplier Model”. Rather
than assigning the multiplier the same value for all people, it is
assumed that R is a random variable, independent of individual
wealth. This provides for likely variations in the responses of peo-
ple with similar wealth, allowing for the presence of other, unspec-
ified influences such as differences in psychological makeup.
The individual’s VPF, V, is then regarded as a continuous ran-
dom variable obeying the relation:
V ¼ RW ð12Þ
where W is wealth, with W and R taken to be continuous random
variables, independent the one of the other. Let the multiplier, R,
take the form:
R ¼ r0 þ Q ð13Þ
where r0  0 is deterministic and Q is a random variable distributed
uniformly over the interval, 0; sð Þ. Thus the probability density func-
tion, f Q qð Þ, for Q is
f Q qð Þ ¼
1
s
0  q  s ð14Þ
The expected value of the multiplier is therefore:
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based on the standard result that the expected value for a uniform
distribution is its central value. The maximum value, r0max, of the
deterministic component, r0, is that which causes the random band
to degenerate to a point of zero length, when E Rð Þ ¼ r0max.
Given that R and W are modelled as independent, the expected
value of their product is simply the product of their expected
values:
E Vð Þ ¼ E Rð ÞE Wð Þ ð16Þ
The average value of individual wealth is calculated using Eq.
(A.5) of Appendix A as:
E Wð Þ ¼ £198;112 ð17Þ
As was the case with the Utility Model, E Vð Þ is set to the mon-
etary value assigned to population-average life expectancy by J-
value analysis, namely £8;587;700. Hence from Eq. (16), the
expected value of the multiplier, R, is:
E Rð Þ ¼ E Vð Þ
E Wð Þ ¼
£8;587;700
£198;112
¼ 43:35 ð18Þ
Using Eq. (15), the extent of the random band, s, is then
s ¼ 86:7 2r0 ð19Þ
Since r0 is deterministic, the variance of R is found by applying
the variance operator to Eq. (13), revealing it to be simply the vari-
ance of Q:
var Rð Þ ¼ var r0 þ Qð Þ ¼ var Qð Þ ¼ s
2
12
ð20Þ
where the last step uses a standard result for a uniform distribution.
Meanwhile the variance of individual wealth may be found
from the tabulated data of Table 1 using Eq. (A.9) of Appendix A:
var Wð Þ ¼ £6:8380 1010 ð21Þ
The variance of V is the product of the two independent random
variables, R and W, which may be written [52]:
var Vð Þ ¼ var RWð Þ ¼ var Rð Þvar Wð Þ þ E Wð Þð Þ2var Rð Þ þ E Rð Þð Þ2var Wð Þ
ð22Þ
with the square root giving the associated standard deviation:
rV ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var Vð Þp .
Varying the deterministic component, r0, of the random multi-
plier, R, will cause the length, s, of the random band to vary. At the
upper limit for r0, r0 ¼ r0max, the multiplier will be wholly deter-
ministic, while at the lower end of the range, r0 ¼ 0, the multiplier,
R, will be uniformly distributed over the full range, 0! 2r0max.
Fig. 4 shows the effect on the probability distribution, f Q qð Þ, for
the random component, Q, of the multiplier as deterministic
component is decreased. The changes in the deterministic
component, r0, will be reflected in alterations to the standard
deviation, rV , for the VPF. Fig. 5 shows the standard deviation,
rV , plotted against the value selected for the deterministic compo-
nent, r0, over the range of possible values: 0  r0  r0max, where
r0max ¼ E Rð Þ ¼ 43:35.
The standard deviation for VPF takes its highest value, £14M
when the multiplier, R, is uniformly random between 0 and
2E Rð Þ, viz. between 0 and 86.7. Most of the variability comes from
the variation of individual wealth in the population, as can be seen
from the last point on the graph, where the multiplier is fixed at
r0 ¼ r0max ¼ E Rð Þ ¼ 43:35 and has zero variance. Putting
var Rð Þ ¼ 0 in Eq. (22) then gives
var Vð Þ ¼ E Rð Þð Þ2var Wð Þ ¼ r20maxvar Wð Þ ð23ÞAt this point rV ¼ r0maxrW ¼ £11:34M. This is only 19% down on
the £14M figure for standard deviation of the VPF that is associated
with a maximally random model for R.
4. Comparison with political opinion polls
4.1. The numbers of respondents in a political opinion poll and in a
survey measurement of a general continuous parameter, A
For compactness, the term, ‘‘b-level precision” is introduced in
this paper as a measure of the precision afforded by the average
value derived from a survey. It is taken to denote the length of
the b% confidence interval for the population mean divided by
the best available estimate of that mean.
Appendix B examines the mathematical representation of polit-
ical opinion polls and sets out the relationships amongst the confi-
dence interval, the margin of error and the b-level precision.
Appendix D explains the relation between the b-level precision
and the confidence interval for a general, continuous parameter
measured by survey.
The b-level precision, k bð ÞA , for the measurement of a general con-
tinuous variable, A, is found from Eq. (D.9) of Appendix D. Particu-
larising r;l and n by assigning the subscript, A, gives:
k bð ÞA ¼ 2b bð Þ
rA
lA
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nA
p ð24Þ
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8 P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044where b bð Þ is the solution to implicit Eq. (B.11) in Appendix B. Thus,
for example, at confidence level of 90%, b 0:90ð Þ ¼ 1:645, while at a
confidence level of 95%, b 0:95ð Þ ¼ 1:96.
k bð ÞA will be an increasing function of b, so that, for example,
k 0:95ð ÞA > k
0:9ð Þ
A > k
0:8ð Þ
A . Once b is specified, k
bð Þ
A provides a quantitative
measure of the precision of the survey measurement of A. At any
given b, the smaller the value of k bð ÞA , the better the precision.
Take now the case of an opinion poll aimed at establishing the
fraction of the population holding a certain view in an upcoming,
tight vote between alternatives. In such a case, b-level precision
takes the simple form (see Appendix B, Eq. (B.20)):
k bð Þpoll ¼
2b bð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
npoll
p ð25Þ
where npoll is the number of respondents to the opinion poll.
Let us now compare two different survey measurements, one
attempting to measure a continuous parameter, A, and the other
a political opinion poll. If they exhibit the same b-level precision,
that is to say if k bð ÞA ¼ k bð Þpoll, then, from Eqs. (24) and (25):
nA
npoll
¼ r
2
A
l2A
¼ var Að Þ
E Að Þð Þ2
ð26Þ
Two features of Eq. (26) are noteworthy:
(i) if the survey measurement of a parameter, A, and the polit-
ical opinion poll are to have the same b-level precision, the
ratio of the number of respondents in the survey for A to
the number in the political opinion survey will depend
solely on the distribution of A in the population
(ii) the result applies to all confidence levels, b.
4.2. The margin of error and the ‘‘12% rule”
Most people are familiar with opinion pollsters quoting a ‘‘mar-
gin of error” to indicate the likely precision of their political predic-
tions. The margin of error may be defined as half the length of the
b ¼95% confidence interval when a binary choice is given and the
probability of either option being supported in the actual vote is
about 50% (see Appendices B and C). Such conditions were met,
for example, in the UK’s EU Referendum of 2016 [54], where
51.9% of the voting public chose the option of leaving the European
Union while 48.1% wanted to remain.
Political opinion pollsters have reached a de facto consensus in
the UK that the margin of error should be no greater than 3%. This
figure implies that the length, w, of the 95% confidence interval
should be no more than 6% in absolute terms. Referred to the frac-
tion of the people voting for a particular option of about 0.5 when
the vote is close, this implies a b-level precision, k bð Þpoll, of 12% or bet-
ter for a political opinion poll with b ¼ 95%: k 0:95ð Þpoll  0:12. Such a b-
level precision may be seen as corresponding to a b-level tolerance
of ±6% or better at b ¼ 95%.
It seems reasonable to require that a survey estimate of any
important population parameter, A, should match the precision
of the political opinion polls frequently carried in newspapers
and the broadcast media. This implies that the b-level precision
at b ¼ 95% should be 12% or better for the survey measurement
of A.
k 0:95ð ÞA ¼ k 0:95ð Þpoll  0:12 ð27Þ
This criterion may be called the ‘‘12% rule”.
When a political opinion poll obeys the 12% rule, then applying
Eq. (B.20) of Appendix B to condition (27) gives:3:92ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
npoll
p  0:12 ð28Þ
so that
npoll  3:920:12
 2
ð29Þ
Thus npoll  1068 after allowing for the integer requirement.
The sample size for the VPF for the same b-level precision is
given, using Eq. (26), as
nV ¼ var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2
npoll ð30Þ
For the Utility Model for a VPF survey, the numerical values of
E Vð Þ and var Vð Þ are given in Eq. (11), so that, combining Eq. (30)
with inequality (29), the sample size when the 12% rule is obeyed
is
nV  2648 ð31Þ
A range of values of E Vð Þ and var Vð Þ are possible for the Multi-
plier Model for VPF survey, corresponding to different values of the
fixed component, r0, of the multiplier, R. Allowing for r0 to span its
full range from 0 to r0max ¼ 43:35 gives the following interval for
the minimum sample number, nV ;min, that will obey the 12% rule
and thus provide a b-level precision of kV 0:95ð Þ  0:12:
1860  nVmin  2835 ð32Þ
Fig. 6 graphs the minimum sample size, nVmin, when the 12%
rule is obeyed for the Multiplier Model for VPF. The ratio of the
fixed component, r0, of multiplier, R, ranges from 0.0, where R is
fully stochastic, to r0max, where the multiplier becomes entirely
deterministic. Also marked up is the minimum number of respon-
dents needed by the Utility Model of VPF survey when the 12% rule
is obeyed.
Comparing inequalities (31) and (32), it is clear that the two
models for VPF survey produce similar estimates for minimum
sample size, with the figure for the Utility Model falling within
the range set by the Multiplier Models.
It may be concluded that the sample size for a VPF survey needs
to be set much higher than for a political opinion poll if both sur-
veys are to satisfy the 12% rule.
4.3. Degenerate lower limits of the ‘‘numbers ratio” of the VPF
minimum sample size to the minimum number of opinion poll
respondents at the same b-level precision
4.3.1. The numbers ratio nV/npoll for the Utility Model for VPF survey
For the case where e–1, the VPF is given by the Utility Model as:
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Fig. 8. Numbers ratio, nV/npoll, for Utility Model of VPF survey and opinion poll, at
the same b-level precision.
P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044 9V ¼ 1
e 1 W
e W  e–1 ð33Þ
Applying the expectation operator, E :ð Þ, gives
E Vð Þ ¼ 1
e 1 E W
e  E Wð Þ  e–1 ð34Þ
while the application of the variance operator, var :ð Þ, to Eq. (33)
produces:
var Vð Þ ¼ 1e1
 2var We W 
¼ 1e1
 2 var We þ var Wð Þ  2cov We;W   e–1 ð35Þ
But
cov We;W
  ¼ q ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar We q ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Wð Þp ð36Þ
where q is the correlation coefficient. When risk-aversion is
e ¼ 1:1605, the correlation coefficient is 0.9955 for the range of
wealths listed in Table 1. See Fig. 7.
Combining Eq., (34)–(36) gives:
var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2 ¼
var Weð Þþvar Wð Þ2q ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Weð Þp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Wð Þp
E Weð ÞE Wð Þð Þ2
 var W
eð Þ2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Weð Þp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Wð Þp þvar Wð Þ
E Weð ÞE Wð Þð Þ2
e–1 ð37Þ
where q  1 has been used in the second step. Factorising the
numerator as a square and using Eq. (26), the ratio of the sample
size for a VPF survey to that for a political opinion poll giving the
same b-level precision is:
nV
npoll
¼ var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var We
 q  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar Wð Þp
E We
  E Wð Þ
0
@
1
A
2
ð38Þ
Since the distribution ofWe is conditioned by the distribution of
wealth,W, Eq. (38) shows that, under the Utility Model of VPF sur-
vey, the ratio of numbers of VPF respondents and political poll
respondents giving the same b-level precision for any b, depends
only on the distribution of wealth.
Fig. 8 plots the numbers ratio, nV=npoll ¼ var Vð Þ= E Vð Þð Þ2, against
risk-aversion, e, when the political opinion poll and the survey
measurement of VPF have a common b-level precision. (The point
at e ¼ 1 may be found numerically as lim
e!1
var Vð Þ= E Vð Þð Þ2, with
e ¼ 1	 d: d ¼ 1:0 108.)
The numbers ratio, nV=npoll, may be seen to reach a minimum
over all positive risk-aversions: e  0 at the point where e ¼ 0.y = 9.5836x
R2 = 0.9911
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Fig. 7. Correlation between we and w.The decrease in the numbers ratio continues as the risk-aversion
falls below 0.0 and moves into the risk confident region, but the
difference from the value at e ¼ 0 affects only the 6th significant
figure as e decreases over the interval, 0! 0:5.
There is a limiting value of the ratio, var Vð Þ= E Vð Þð Þ2, for the
degenerate case when the risk-aversion is zero. Inserting e ¼ 0 into
either Eq. (38) or the first line of Eq. (37) to give:
var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2
¼ var Wð Þ
E Wð Þ  1ð Þ2
 var Wð Þ
E Wð Þð Þ2
ð39Þ
where the last step follows from the fact that E Wð Þ, at £198,112, is 5
orders of magnitude greater than £1.
Each person’s individual VPF will decrease as e drops, and by Eq.
(9), when e ¼ 0, then v i ¼ wi  1  wi. Hence the average value of
the VPF will fall to approximately the average value of wealth,
£198,112 (strictly to £198,111).
On combining Eqs. (39) and (30), it is clear that, no matter what
value of risk-aversion is employed in the utility function (and
hence whatever the VPF produced), the number of respondents
needed to measure the VPF by survey must be at least 74% bigger
than the number consulted in a political opinion poll giving the
same b-level precision.
It will be shown in Section 4.3.2 that the Multiplier Model pro-
duces the same degenerate limiting value for the numbers ratio,
nV=npoll, when the b-level precision is the same for the VPF survey
as for a political opinion poll.
4.3.2. The numbers ratio nV /npoll for the Multiplier Model for VPF
survey
Dividing Eq. (22) by E Vð Þð Þ2 and using Eq. (16) produces
var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2 ¼
var Rð Þvar Wð Þþ E Wð Þð Þ2var Rð Þþ E Rð Þð Þ2var Wð Þ
E Rð Þð Þ2 E Wð Þð Þ2
¼ var Wð Þ
E Wð Þð Þ2 1þ
var Rð Þ
E Rð Þð Þ2
 	
þ var Rð Þ
E Rð Þð Þ2
ð40Þ
Hence
var Vð Þ
E Vð Þð Þ2
! var Wð Þ
E Wð Þð Þ2
as var Rð Þ ! 0 ð41Þ
In the degenerate case, as r0 ! r0max, so the variance, var Rð Þ, dis-
appears and the multiplier becomes entirely deterministic. Eq. (41)
is the outcome, a result for the Multiplier Model that mirrors Eq.
(39) for the Utility Model when the risk-aversion is set to zero.
10 P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044Eq. (41) will be valid for all E Rð Þ : E Rð Þ–0 and thus will apply to
any positive expected value, E Rð Þ, set for the multiplier. This con-
clusion holds irrespective of the initial probability distribution
for the multiplier, R. The resulting condition gives the numbers
ratio as:
nV
npoll
 var Wð Þ
E Wð Þð Þ2
¼ 1:74 ð42Þ
if the b-level precision of the VPF survey is to match that of the
political opinion poll.
The fact that there is no dependence on E Rð Þmeans that Eq. (42)
will hold whether the VPF is assumed to be £8.5M or £1M or £2M
or £20M or any other value.
The generality of these arguments means that they may be
applied to the survey measurement in the UK of any parameter,
A, that is strongly wealth-dependent. Hence the numbers ratio will
obey the condition:
nA
npoll
 1:74 ð43Þ
when the b-level precision for the survey for parameter, A, is the
same as that of the opinion poll. Condition (43) devolves into an
equality when the measurand, A, is proportional to wealth; such
an eventuality includes the case where what is to be measured is
wealth itself. (This last statement follows directly from Eq. (26),
of course.)
4.4. b-Level precisions at b = 95% for different sample sizes
Fig. 9 gives another perspective by plotting, against sample size,
the b-level precisions for the Utility and the Multiplier Models for
VPF survey, as well as the b-level precision for a political opinion
poll, all at b = 95%. The curve for the Multiplier Model of VPF survey
incorporates the assumption that r0 takes its central value, 12 r0max.
It is clear, when the number of respondents is the same, that the
precision of the opinion poll prediction will be significantly better
than that of either model of VPF survey. Conversely, the Utility and
Multiplier Models for VPF survey require a significantly greater
sample size to achieve the same level of precision as a political
opinion poll.
It is also evident that the b-level precision of the VPF survey will
deteriorate increasingly rapidly for sample sizes less than about
500, irrespective of which model of the VPF survey is used.
Fig. 9 may also be as a test for a biased sample. Suppose that a
survey is carried out to measure a strongly wealth-dependent0%
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Fig. 9. b-Level precision at b = 95% as a function of sample size for the two models
for VPF survey and for the opinion poll. The 12% rule is also marked.parameter but that the number of opinions canvassed is low, say
100 people. Unbiased estimates might still be made of the mean
and the standard deviation based on the opinions in the 100-
strong sample. If these were used to calculate a b-level precision
at b ¼ 95% that was much lower than the curves in Fig. 9, at say
14%, this would suggest that the opinions surveyed showed too lit-
tle diversity, implying that the sample had not been chosen ran-
domly across the board. Achieving a b-level precision at b ¼ 95%
that was similar to those predicted for this sample size by the Util-
ity or Multiplier Model would, however, be no guarantee that peo-
ple with the necessary spread of wealths had been canvassed.5. Discussion
Statistics from the UK’s Office for National Statistics enable the
range of wealth held by individuals in the United Kingdom to be
assessed and the distribution to be characterised by the percentiles
listed in Table 1. Extrapolation has been needed for the starting and
finishing points (0% and 100%), and the top figure for personal
wealth in the table is accepted as being too low. While Table 1
encompasses an extensive range of wealth, the variance of individ-
ual wealth in the UK will tend to be somewhat understated even so.
The size of sample needed to give adequate precision may be
appreciated by reference to the ‘‘margin of error” used by political
opinion surveyors. All other things being equal, the greater the
sample size the better the precision of the opinion poll’s prediction.
General agreement appears to have emerged amongst the UK’s
practitioners that a margin of error of 3% is the highest figure at
which a reasonable compromise may be struck between the
expense of the survey and the commercially valuable reputation
of the polling organisation. A margin of error of 3% or better will
require the political opinion pollster to question at least 1068 ran-
domly selected people.
The concept of ‘‘b-level precision”, k bð Þ, can be used to generalise
the margin of error to other types of survey. The ‘‘12% rule” extends
the 3% margin of error or better (k 0:95ð Þ  0:12) customary for a
political opinion poll to surveys of continuous parameters. Mea-
surement exercises conducted in line with this rule will encompass
the true mean within 	6% of the estimated average about 95% of
the time, which seems a reasonable aim.
The number of respondents needed in a survey measurement of
a general continuous parameter, A, may be related to the size of the
sample required for a political opinion poll when both have to sat-
isfy the same b-level precision. The ‘‘numbers ratio” of the sample
sizes in the two surveys then equals the variance of A divided by
the square of its expected value. This result, valid at all values of
b and b-level precision, means that the sample size for survey mea-
surement of a continuous parameter that is strongly dependent on
wealth will need always to be substantially greater than that of a
political opinion poll.
Applying this finding to individual wealth in the UK gives the
numbers ratio as 1.74, so that the number of people needing to be
consulted in the determination of average wealth needs to be 1860
in order to just satisfy the 12% rule: k 0:95ð ÞW ¼ 0:12. This sample size
may be compared with the equivalent number, 1068, needed for a
political opinion poll at the same b-level precision, viz. k 0:95ð Þpoll ¼ 0:12.
The ‘‘value of a prevented fatality” is an example of a population
parameter that is conditioned by wealth. Two diverse mathemati-
cal descriptions are offered of the process of measuring the popu-
lation average VPF by opinion survey. The first, the Utility Model,
accords with the description presented in the VPF paper by Carthy
et al. [20], as analysed in [34]. The Utility Model provides a justifi-
cation for the intuition that the individual’s personal VPF will
depend strongly on his/her wealth.
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mathematical description is developed for the VPF survey, namely
the ‘‘Multiplier Model”. Now the person’s VPF is found by multiply-
ing his/her wealth by a random factor that is uniformly distributed
between limits. Two sources of random variation are present in
this model, first in the process by which a respondent is selected
and second in the size of the multiplier.
The parameters of the two models may be adjusted so that each
produces a population average VPF to match the average value of
life to come for a UK citizen found by the J-value, viz. £8,587,700
(2015 £s). For the Utility Model of the VPF survey, this means that
the risk-aversion parameter should take the value e ¼ 1:1605,
which is well within ranges for risk-aversion suggested by the
UK Treasury. Matching the same figure for the VPF in the Multiplier
Model requires the expected value of the multiplier to be 43.35.
Similar variances for the individual’s VPF then emerge from the
two independent systems of equations. There is overlap in the val-
ues of standard deviation predicted by the two models, with equal-
ity occurring at the point where the deterministic factor, r0, in the
multiplier, R, is about 10% of its maximum value, r0max, in the Mul-
tiplier Model, implying that the multiplier then contains only a
small deterministic component.
Under the 12% rule, the minimum sample size is 2648 for the
Utility Model of the VPF survey. Meanwhile the minimum number
of people needing to be consulted is estimated under the Multiplier
Model to lie between 1860 and 2835, a range that encompasses the
figure coming from the Utility Model.
There is a degenerate lower limit for the numbers ratio of the
minimum sample size in a VPF survey to the corresponding figure
in a political opinion poll at matching b-level precisions. This
degenerate lower limit is the same for both the Utility Model and
the Multiplier Model, and is found to depend only on the distribu-
tion of wealth in the population. It is thus clear that the need for
high sample sizes is driven mainly by the variation in individual
wealth in the nation.
In the case of the Utility Model of VPF survey measurement, the
degenerate lower limit for minimum sample size, 1860, occurs
when the risk-aversion, e, declines to zero. The population average
VPF will decrease in tandem, and will be to all intents and purposes
identical to the average individual wealth, £198,000, by the time
risk neutrality has been reached. At this point the survey measure-
ment of the VPF will share the characteristics of wealth measure-
ment by survey. This explains why the sample size has fallen to
exactly that needed to find the average wealth under the 12% rule,
as discussed in paragraph 5 of this Section.
The same degenerate lower limit for sample size, 1860 obtains
in the Multiplier Model when the deterministic component of the
multiplier, r0, has reached its maximum value, r0 ¼ r0max ¼ E Rð Þ,
and the multiplier is fully deterministic. The result is independent
of the value previously specified for the expectation, E Rð Þ, of the
multiplier, R. Thus at least 1860 people would always need to be
consulted in order for the measurement to conform to the 12% rule,
no matter what the value chosen for E Rð Þand hence irrespective of
the value of the VPF under the Multiplier Model.
The convergence of the two diverse models at a degenerate
lower limit for minimum sample size suggests that the number
of people surveyed will always need to be at least 1860, irrespec-
tive of the value of the VPF.
The next agreement between the two VPF survey models occurs
at a minimum sample size of 2648 people, the figure found using
the Utility Model when set up to give a VPF to match the J-value
generated figure of £8.59M. This sample size is, in fact, likely to
be an underestimate as it does not allow for the variation in
response likely amongst people with very similar levels of wealth.
Including this realistic possibility would increase the necessarysample size. The effect has been quantified in Appendix E by
extending the Utility Model through the introduction of a multi-
plier to represent the variation likely between the stated VPFs for
people with very similar levels of wealth. Allowing for a random
variation of 	50% on each person’s calculated personal VPF takes
the minimum sample size to 2958.
Applying the 12% rule, the range of VPFs suggested by the Mul-
tiplier Model is 1860! 2835, while the Extended Utility Model
gives the overlapping range 2648! 3887. The midpoint of the
extremal values is thus (1860 + 3887)/2 = 2874. It is possible to
conclude, in broad terms, that the minimum sample size for mea-
suring the VPF by survey is likely to be 3000 or more randomly
chosen people in order to comply with the 12% rule. This level of
precision, equivalent to a tolerance of 	6% at the 95% confidence
level, seems a reasonable objective. For comparison, this sample
size is still only a sixth of the 18,000 people questioned by the
Office of National Statistics in its survey of household wealth.
While the Utility Model is specific to the VPF, the Multiplier
Model provides a general paradigm that can be applied to the sur-
vey measurement of any continuous parameter that is strongly
dependent on wealth. In all such cases the minimum sample size
must be 1860 if the 12% rule is to be obeyed, and it may well be
that more people will need to be questioned.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the sample size used in the
opinion survey [33] on which the UK VPF is based was only 167.
[In fact Carthy et al. reduced their sample size to 149 (Table 3 of
[33]) to find the set of ‘‘trimmedmeans” that influenced their finally
recommended VPF value; meanwhile, in generating their Table 7,
they reduced the number of people in their sample to 135]. It is
clear from theminimum sample sizes derived in this paper and dis-
cussed above that the sample size onwhich the UK VPF is basedwas
at least an order of magnitude too small, and hence wholly inade-
quate. Obviously any similar exercise in the future would need to
be scaled up very significantly so that the views of 3000 or more
randomly chosen individuals could be sampled.
Table 2 shows the sample size figures for the Multiplier Model
for VPF, the Utility Model and the Extended Utility Model discussed
in Appendix E. These are compared and contrasted with the sample
size used by the ONS for measuring individual wealth [43] and the
sample size used to generate the UK VPF [33]. Small scale exercises
in opinion surveying to find a VPF are clearly ruled out for the
future.
A further feature of the Carthy study [33] is the anomalously
low level of the average wealth of its respondents, as revealed in
[34]. The problem of obtaining proper representation for wealthier
people in the statistics is recognised by the ONS. Its statisticians
stress in the commentary on their survey of national wealth that
special care is needed to include adequate number of richer
respondents, saying:
‘‘As wealth is known to be unevenly distributed, addresses more
likely to contain wealthier households were sampled at a higher
rate to improve the efficiency of the sample. These addresses were
identified utilising data from HMRC.” – Section 8: Quality and
methodology of [43].
Equal care is clearly needed in the survey of any population
parameter, such as the VPF, known to be strongly dependent on
wealth.
The figures for sample size derived in the paper are predicated
on the assumption that the sample is chosen randomly across the
whole population. As noted by the ONS, it will generally not be
easy in practice to guarantee that the selection is truly random
across the full spectrum of individual wealth.
The statistics for individual wealth pertain to the United King-
dom in the period 2014–2016. Clearly there will be differences in
detail between different nations and they will change over time.
Table 2
Summary of sample sizes.
Description Actual sample size Under 12% rule
Degenerate, lower limit
on sample size
Central figure for minimum
sample size
Range of minimum sample sizes
as multiplier deterministic
component, r0, varies
Multiplier Model of VPF survey – 1860a 2104
(r0 ¼ r0max=2)
1860–2835
Utility Model of VPF survey – 1860b 2648 –
Extended Utility Model of VPF survey – 1860c 2958
(r0 ¼ r0max=2)
2648–3887
UK VPF survey by Chilton et al. 167 – – –
a Deterministic multiplier: r0 ¼ r0max.
b Risk-aversion = zero.
c Deterministic multiplier: r0 ¼ r0max and risk-aversion = zero.
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likely to give good guidance to those intending to undertake a sur-
vey measurement of any parameter that is strongly wealth depen-
dent in a developed country.
The measurement by survey of household wealth, as carried out
by the Office of National Statistics, enjoys a significant advantage
over the estimation of a general, non-market parameter, in that it
is possible to break down a household’s wealth into assets for a
which amarket exists: bank accounts, shares, property etc. This will
allow a reasonably accurate quantification of the monetary value of
each class of holding, and, as long as all assets are identified, will
permit a similarly accurate and testable quantification of total
wealth. Unfortunately such a methodical mode of proceeding is
not available to those attempting a stated preference survey, for
example a survey estimation of the VPF. In such a case, while
choosing a sample truly randomly and ensuring it is of adequate
size can provide the desired b-level precision for the survey,
the accuracy of the resulting figure cannot be relied upon for the
reasons outlined by Fujiwara and Campbell [30], as discussed in
Section 1.2 above.6. Conclusions
The large variation in individual wealth in a developed country
like the UK means that the sample size for the survey measure-
ment of a continuous parameter that is strongly dependent on
wealth will always need to be at least 75% larger than the sample
size of a political opinion poll giving the equivalent level of preci-
sion. This sets a degenerate lower limit of about 2000 on the min-
imum sample size for the survey measurement of a such a
parameter at an achieved precision equivalent to the 3% margin
of error common in political opinion polls.
In the case of the UK ‘‘value of a prevented fatality”, the sample
size needs to be about 3000, based on the Extended Utility Model
likely to be most realistic, if the precision of the survey is to match
that of the political opinion polls that people are used to seeing
reported in their national media.
It should be emphasised that the selection of the sample needs
to be fully random across the whole population for the survey to
have validity. Particular care is needed if the opinions of wealthy
people are to be captured adequately.
It is clear that small scale opinion surveys cannot provide ade-
quate precision in the measurement of continuous parameters,
such as the VPF, that have a strong dependence on wealth.
No confidence can be placed in the figure for the VPF used as a
safety yardstick by the UK government because the sample size
used in its foundational opinion survey, 167, is less than a tenth
of what would be required to give reasonable precision. This addsto the catalogue of well documented problems besetting the UK
VPF, the use of which is not justified.
The Fujiwara and Campbell caveat needs always to be borne in
mind, of course, that stated preferences do not necessarily repre-
sent true preferences. Hence even when a survey has included a
wide enough spread of randomly chosen respondents to provide
good precision, the test of accuracy may still not be passed.
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Appendix A. Deriving the mean and variance from tabular data
for cumulative probability
The probability distribution for a general random variable, X, is
sometimes given in the form of a table of values, xi, for points at reg-
ular intervals of cumulative probability, FX xið Þ. In general, the table
will containn + 1 pairs, xi; FX xið Þð Þ, i ¼ 0;1;2; :::;n, and the n intervals
of x, xi1 ! xi, i ¼ 1;2;3; :::;n, will have a length, xi  xi1, that can be
expected to vary. By contrast, the regularity of the intervals of FX
means that they will all have the same length:
DFX ¼ 1n ðA:1Þ
Here, for example, n ¼ 4 if the data are given in quartiles, n ¼ 10
if given in deciles and n ¼ 100 for a table of percentiles such as
Table 1.
The probability density function, f X xð Þ, may be calculated for
each interval of x after assuming a piece-wise uniform increase
in cumulative probability, FX xð Þ, between quantiles. Thus
f X xð Þ ¼ FX xið ÞFX xi1ð Þxixi1 ¼
DFX
xixi1
¼ f X;i
for
xi1  x < xi
i ¼ 1;2; :::;n ðA:2Þ
in which 0 is the index of the first data point, x0; FX x0ð Þð Þ and n is the
index of the last data point, xn; FX xnð Þð Þ, where FX x0ð Þ ¼ 0 and
FX xnð Þ ¼ 1. The expected value of X is then:
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Z xn
x¼x0
xf X xð Þdx ¼
Z x1
x0
xf X;1dxþ
Z x2
x1
xf X;2dxþ :::
þ
Z xi
xi1
xf X;idxþ :::þ
Z xn
xn1
xf X;ndx ¼ f X;1
Z x1
x0
xdx
þ f X;2
Z x2
x1
xdxþ :::þ f X;i
Z xi
xi1
xdxþ :::þ f X;n
Z xn
xn1
xdx
¼ f X;1
x21  x20
2
þ f X;2
x22  x21
2
þ :::
þ f X;i
x2i  x2i1
2
þ :::þ f X;n
x2n  x2n1
2
ðA:3Þ
Expanding the differences between squares and using Eq. (A.2),
allows Eq. (A.3) to be transformed into:
E Xð Þ¼ DFX
x1x0
x1xoð Þ x1þxoð Þ
2
þ DFX
x2x1
x2x1ð Þ x2þx1ð Þ
2
þ :::þ DFX
xixi1
xixi1ð Þ xiþxi1ð Þ
2
þ :::
þ DFX
xnxn1
xnxn1ð Þ xnþxn1ð Þ
2
¼DFX
2
x0þx1ð Þþ x1þx2ð Þþ :::þ xi1þxið Þþ :::þ xn1þxnð Þð Þ
ðA:4Þ
where the last line follows by cancellation of the factor, xi  xi1,
i = 1, 2, . . ., n.
Using Eq. (A.1), the expected or mean value may thus be
restated as
E Xð Þ ¼ 1
2n
x0 þ 2
Xn1
i¼1
xi þ xn
 !
ðA:5Þ
Meanwhile the second moment of X is given by:
E X2
 	
¼
Z xn
x¼x0
x2f X xð Þdx¼
Z x1
x0
x2f X;1dxþ
Z x2
x1
x2f X;2dxþ :::
þ
Z xi
xi1
x2f X;idxþ :::þ
Z xn
xn1
x2f X;ndx¼ f X;1
Z x1
x0
x2dx
þ f X;2
Z x2
x1
x2dxþ :::þ f X;i
Z xi
xi1
x2dxþ :::þ f X;n
Z xn
xn1
x2dx
¼ f X;1
x31x30
3
þ f X;2
x32x31
3
þ :::þ f X;i
x3i x3i1
3
þ :::
þ f X;n
x3nx3n1
3
¼ f X;1 x1x0ð Þ
x21þx1x0þx20
3
þ f X;2 x2x1ð Þ
x22þx2x1þx21
3
:::
þ f X;i xixi1ð Þ
x3i þxixi1þx2i1
3
þ :::
þ f X;n xnxn1ð Þ
x3nþxnxn1þx2n1
3
ðA6Þ
Substituting from Eq. (A.2) into Eq. (A.6) gives:
E X2
 	
¼ DFX
3
x21 þ x1x0 þ x20 þ x22 þ x2x1 þ x21:::þ x3i þ xixi1
þx2i1 þ :::þ x3n þ xnxn1 þ x2n1
 !
ðA7Þ
After grouping values and using Eq. (A.1), this gives:
E X2
 	
¼ 1
3n
x20 þ 2
Xn1
i¼1
x2i þ x2n þ
Xn
i¼1
xixi1
 !
ðA8Þ
The variance of X may be calculated by substituting Eqs. (A.5)
and (A.8) into:
var Xð Þ ¼ E X2
 	
 E Xð Þð Þ2 ðA9ÞAppendix B. The confidence interval, the margin of error used in
political opinion polls and b-level precision
B.1. Modelling an opinion poll as a binomial random process
A binomial random process is a natural model to use when
interpreting opinion polls held in advance of the formal vote they
are intended to predict. X is then a random variable representing
the number of people found to hold a certain view in a poll of n
people.
The binomial process is linked to the normal distribution by the
De Moivre-Laplace Limit Theorem [53], which states that, for any
numbers, a and b, on the real axis:
lim
n!1
P a 
X
n  pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þp = ﬃﬃﬃnp  b
 !
¼ U bð Þ U að Þ ðB:1Þ
Here p is the fraction holding the specified opinion in the pop-
ulation as a whole and
U xð Þ ¼
Z x
1
f Z zð Þdz ðB:2Þ
is the cumulative probability to x of a standard normal distribution,
for which the probability density is
f Z zð Þ ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p ez22 ðB:3Þ
As a matter of practicality, of course, no opinion poll can consult
the infinite number of people required by Eq. (B.1). But fortunately
the distribution will retain approximate normality for finite but
large n, when it is possible to write:
P a  G X;n;pð Þ  bð Þ  U bð Þ U að Þ ðB:4Þ
where the random number, G X;n;pð Þ, is given by:
G X;n;pð Þ ¼
X
n  p
1ﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þp ðB:5Þ
It is useful to know that the expected value of G X;n; pð Þ will be
zero, a result that follows from applying the expectation operator,
E :ð Þ, to both sides of Eq. (B.5) and taking account of the fact that n
and p are both deterministic:
E G X;n;pð Þð Þ ¼ 1
1ﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þp
1
n
E Xð Þ  p
 
¼ 0 ðB:6Þ
where the last step follows from the fact that for a binomial distri-
bution, E Xð Þ ¼ np.
B.2. The confidence interval
This subsection will calculate the minimum length of the ran-
dom interval that has a specified probability, b, of containing the
true population fraction, p. This minimum length is carried over
to the confidence interval that is quoted for the sample estimate
of that fraction.
The interval, a; bð Þ, connecting any positions, a and b : b > a, on
the real axis will have length, x ¼ b a. If the positions, a and b,
are allowed to vary while keeping the length, x, of the interval
constant, then the probability of containing G in the interval
between a and b, P a  G  bð Þ, will be greatest when a ¼ b and
the interval, b; bð Þ, is symmetrical about the origin. As E Gð Þ ¼ 0
by Eq. (B.6), the resulting interval will also be centred on E Gð Þ.
Moreover, if the probability, P a  G  bð Þ, of capturing G in the
interval between a and b is specified, and the length, x ¼ b a,
of that interval is varied to achieve the required probability, then
this length will be minimised when that interval straddles the ori-
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
x/n
Er
ro
r o
n 
95
%
 c
on
fid
en
ce
 in
te
rv
al
Fig. 10. Error on 95% confidence interval against assumed value of x/n.
14 P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044gin symmetrically. A demonstration of these results is given in
Appendix C.
Putting a ¼ b to give the shortest interval that will satisfy the
specified probability and combining Eqs. (B.4), (B.5) and (C.3) from
Appendix C gives:
P b 
X
n  p
1ﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þp  b
 !
 U bð Þ U bð Þ ¼ 2U bð Þ  1 ðB:7Þ
Rearranging the inequality contained within the probability
brackets gives
P
X
n
 b 1ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
 p  X
n
þ b 1ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p 
 2U bð Þ  1
ðB:8Þ
For example, when b ¼ 1:96, U bð Þ ¼ 0:975 and so
2U bð Þ  1 ¼ 0:95 or 95% when the probability is expressed as a
percentage. Thus the probability is 95% that the population fraction
will be contained within the random interval defined in Eq. (B.8)
with b ¼ 1:96. The length of this interval is
w ¼ 2 bﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
¼ 2 1:96ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
ðB:9Þ
which is the shortest length able to contain the true population
fraction, p, with 95% probability. The interval is centred on the ran-
dom variable, X=n, which has an expected value, E Xð Þ=n ¼ p,
because X is binomially distributed.
When the opinion poll has been completed and the number of
people with a specified opinion has been found to be x, then replac-
ing the random variable, X, with the outturn, x, in the main brack-
eted term defines the b% confidence interval:
x
n
 b bð Þ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
;
x
n
þ b bð Þ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p 
ðB:10Þ
where b bð Þ is the solution of the implicit equation:
U bð Þ ¼ 1
2
1þ b
100
 
ðB:11Þ
The length of the confidence interval, now named wpoll to tie it
explicitly to the political opinion poll, is:
w bð Þpoll ¼
2b bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
ðB:12Þ
This equation makes it explicit that the length of the confidence
interval will depend on the probability, b, associated with b (the
two quantities are linked via Eq. (B.11)).
As the confidence interval and the probability interval share the
same length, it follows that the length of the confidence interval
specifies the shortest interval length with the potential to contain
p with probability, b %, in a similar survey to be carried out in the
future.
B.3. The margin of error and b-level precision
A plebiscite normally offers two, mutually exclusive options, as
was the case, for example, in the EU Referendum held in the United
Kingdom on 23 June 2016. Here the electorate was invited to
choose between two options: either for the UK to remain in the
European Union or for the country to leave that economic and
political grouping, with the Government undertaking to accept
the people’s majority verdict. The result was close, but in the event,
16,141, 241 (48.1%) people voted to remain and 17,410,742 people
(51.9%) voted to leave [54].
The objective of the numerous opinion polls published in
national newspapers in advance of the referendum was to estimatethe actual fraction, p, of those who would vote to leave the EU,
should the ballot be held on the day the opinion survey was per-
formed. From Eq. (B.12), the length of the confidence interval will
depend only on the number, n, of people questioned if p is known
(perhaps known approximately, between limits). For example,
when p ¼ 0:5, then
w bð Þpoll ¼
b bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðB:13Þ
This equation allows the length of the confidence interval to be
calculated as soon as the probability, b, and the number of people
in the survey, n, are known. Alternatively, specification of the prob-
ability, b, and the desired length, w bð Þpoll, of the confidence interval
will allow a determination of the necessary sample size, n, in
advance of the survey being carried out.
If p is not known, but is estimated as p  x=n after the survey
has been carried out, then (B.12) becomes:
w bð Þpoll ¼
2b bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x
n
1 x
n
 	r
ðB:14Þ
Since Eq. (B.14) relies on the result of the survey, it cannot be
solved in advance. However, the dependence on x=n in Eq. (B.14)
may be removed in two ways that lead to similar results. First, it
may be noted that, in general, the expression y 1 yð Þ experiences
a maximum of 0.25 at y ¼ 0:5. This prompts the consideration of
wpollmax ¼ max
x=n
wpoll, as a conservative (i.e. overlarge) estimate of
wpoll. This implies substituting x=n ¼ 0:5 in the right-hand side of
Eq. (B.14), which then produces:
w bð Þpollmax ¼
b bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðB:15Þ
But another way of proceeding is to assume that the contest is
going to be close, as in the case of the EU Referendum, implying
x=n  0:5. This leads directly to Eq. (B.13).
While the exact nature of the derivation of Eq. (B.15) is mathe-
matically satisfying, its usefulness in practice rests on the de facto
approximation
w bð Þpoll  w bð Þpollmax ðB:16Þ
which returns attention to Eq. (B.13). Despite being approximate
when x=n–0:5, this equation is significantly robust against varia-
tions in x=n, as shown by Fig. 10. For example, the error introduced
by applying Eq. (B.13) rather than the full form of Eq. (B.14) is less
than 10% over the range: 0:283  x=n  0:717.
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the margin of error, defined as:
m bð Þ ¼ w
bð Þ
poll
2
ðB:17Þ
The bracketed superscripts in Eq. (B.17) make it clear that the
margin of error will depend, as does w bð Þpoll, on the selection of the
probability, b, at which b is found (Eq. (B.11)).
Combining Eqs. (B.13) and (B.17) gives:
n ¼ b
bð Þ
2m bð Þ
 !2
ðB:18Þ
While the margin of error,m bð Þ, is an absolute figure, the expres-
sion, m bð Þ= x=nð Þ, gives the tolerance relative to the estimated frac-
tion, x=n. From Eqs. (B.13) and (B.18)
m bð Þ
x=n

x=n¼0:5
¼ m
bð Þ
0:5
¼ w bð Þpoll ¼
b bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðB:19Þ
The expression, b bð Þ=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
, gives a measure, conditioned on b, of
the precision of the prediction for the later referendum or election.
Similarly the relative length, k bð Þpoll, of the b% confidence interval, rel-
ative to x=n when x=n ¼ 0:5, which will be double b bð Þ= ﬃﬃﬃnp , must
also be a measure of the precision of the prediction. This new term,
kpoll bð Þ, is again conditioned on the probability and hence confi-
dence level, b, chosen, and it will be termed the ‘‘b-level precision”:
k bð Þpoll ¼
w bð Þpoll
x=n

x=n¼0:5
¼ 2m
bð Þ
x=n

x=n¼0:5
¼ 2b
bð Þﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðB:20Þ
UK political opinion polls normally use a 95% confidence inter-
val so that b ¼ 95%, which implies from Eq. (B.11) that b ¼ 1:96.
The margin of error is conventionally set equal to 3% in the UK,
so that m 0:95ð Þ ¼ 0:03. The equivalent b-level precision is 4 times
this figure:
k 0:95ð Þpoll ¼ 4m 0:95ð Þ ¼ 0:12 ðB:21ÞAppendix C. Minimising the interval containing the population
average with a specified probability in an opinion poll
C.1. Maximising the probability of an interval of given length
containing the population fraction, p
Consider a general, symmetrical interval, a; bð Þ, as shown in
Fig. 11(a)–11(c), where
a ¼ b ðC:1Þ
By the symmetry evident in Fig. 11, of the probability density of
the standard normal distribution, if any number, c, is chosen, then
the cumulative probability to – c is the complement of the cumu-
lative probability to c:
U cð Þ ¼ 1U cð Þ ðC:2Þ
Using Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2) in Eq. (B.4) produces
P a  G X;n;pð Þ  bð Þ  2U bð Þ  1 ðC:3Þ
Now consider the case where b is reduced by a difference,
d : d > 0, to b d. To maintain the length of the interval at b a,
it is necessary to reduce a by the same amount to a d. The prob-
ability associated with this new interval, a d; b dð Þ, is given,
using Eq. (B.4), as:
P a d  G X;n;pð Þ  b dð Þ  U b dð Þ U a dð Þ ðC:4ÞBut, using Eq. (C.1) and then Eq. (C.2),
U a dð Þ ¼ U b dð Þ ¼ 1U bþ dð Þ ðC:5Þ
Hence, on substituting Eq. (C.5) into Eq. (C.4)
P a d  G X;n;pð Þ  b dð Þ  U b dð Þ þU bþ dð Þ  1 ðC:6Þ
The change in probability, DP dð Þ, caused by reducing b by an
amount, d, while maintaining the length of the interval constant
may be found by subtracting Eq. (C.3) from Eq. (C.6):
DP dð Þ  U b dð Þ þU bþ dð Þ  1 2U bð Þ  1ð Þ
¼ U bþ dð Þ U bð Þ  U bð Þ U b dð Þf g ðC:7Þ
Eq. (C.7) remains valid when d is added to b (when a! aþ d to
maintain a constant interval length). This leads to an increase in
the area under the probability density curve of U bþ dð Þ U bð Þon
the right but a decrease of U aþ dð Þ U að Þ on the left. But
U aþ dð Þ U að Þ ¼ U bþ dð Þ U bð Þ
¼ 1U b dð Þ  1U bð Þð Þ ¼ U bð Þ U b dð Þ
ðC:8Þ
It follows that
DP þdð Þ ¼ U bþ dð Þ U bð Þf g  U bð Þ U b dð Þf g ðC:9Þ
so that, on comparing Eqs. (C.7) and (C.9), DP þdð Þ ¼ DP dð Þ, as
claimed.
To proceed further it is now necessary to distinguish between
the three exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: d  b, b < d  2b
and d > 2b. See Figs. 11(a), 11(b) and 11(c).
d  b Referring to Fig. 11(a) Eq. (C.7) may be expanded using the
definition of U xð Þ in Eq. (B.2) and using the following three inter-
mediate points in the various integrations: b d; b and bþ d:
DP dð Þ 
Z b
1
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z bþd
b
f Z zð Þdz
" #

Z b
1
f Z zð Þdz

Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdz
" #

Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdz
( )
ðC:10Þ
Hence
DP dð Þ 
Z bþd
b
f Z zð Þdz
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdz ðC:11Þ
The terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (C.11) are the shaded
areas shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 11 (a). It is visually clear
that the first term in Eq. (C.11) is smaller than the second, indicat-
ing that DP dð Þ must be negative: DP dð Þ < 0.
More formally, by the definition of the standard normal proba-
bility density (Eq. (B.3)), it is plain that the density will be higher
the closer z is to 0:
f Z z1j jð Þ > f Z z2j jð Þ for z1j j < z2j j ðC:12Þ
Since in this case, 0 < d  b, it follows that
f Z zð Þ > f Z bð Þ for b d < z < b ðC:13Þ
While
f Z zð Þ < f Z bð Þ for b < z < bþ d ðC:14Þ
Thus the second integrand in Eq. (C.11) will always be larger
than the first and, since the length of the integration interval is
the same (¼ d), it follows thatZ bþd
b
f Z zð Þdz <
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdz ðC:15Þ
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Fig. 11. Probability density for the standard normal distribution.
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DP dð Þ < 0 ðC:16Þ
b < d  2b This case is illustrated in Fig. 11(b), which differs
from Fig. 11(a) in that the curve defining the area,
R b
bd f Z zð Þdz,
undergoes a maximum between the two integration limits. How-
ever, the areas under the probability density curve in Eq. (C.11)
remain contiguous, and the rationale remains the same as for the
case where d < b. As before, f Z zð Þ > f Z bð Þ for b d < z < b, includ-
ing for the limiting case in this category, where d ¼ 2b.
d > 2b Fig. 11(c) shows this case. In expanding Eq. (C.7), 5 inter-
mediate points are now used as limits in the various integrations:
b d;b; b;bþ d and bþ d. Hence
DP dð Þ
Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z bþd
b
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z bþd
bþd
f Z zð Þdz
" #

Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdz
" #

Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdz
" #

Z bd
1
f Z zð Þdz
( )
¼
Z bþd
b
f Z zð Þdzþ
Z bþd
bþd
f Z zð Þdz
Z b
bd
f Z zð Þdz
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdz
ðC:17Þ
But, by Eq. (C.2)
Rbþd
b f Z zð Þdz ¼ U bþ dð Þ U bð Þ ¼ 1U b dð Þ  1U bð Þð Þ
¼ U bð Þ U b dð Þ ¼ Rbbd f Z zð Þdz
ðC:18Þ
Hence the 1st and 3rd terms in the final line of Eq. (C.17) cancel
and:
DP dð Þ 
Z bþd
bþd
f Z zð Þdz
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdz ðC:19Þ
These two areas are shaded in Fig. 11(c), from which it is visu-
ally clear that the second area is bigger than the first. But proceed-
ing formally, since now d > 2b, it follows that bþ d > b. Hence by
condition (C.12)
f Z zð Þ < f Z bð Þ for  bþ d < z < bþ d ðC:20Þ
By contrast
f Z zð Þ > f Z bð Þ for  b < z < b ðC:21Þ
Since the length of the integration interval is the same in the
two integrals (=2b), it follows that the second integral will be larger
than the first and so, once again condition (C.16) applies:
DP dð Þ < 0.
The necessary result is thus demonstrated: if the positions, a
and b, are allowed to vary while keeping the length, x ¼ b a, of
the interval constant, then the probability of containing G in the
interval between a and b, P a  G  bð Þ, will be greatest when
a ¼ b andx ¼ 2b. Any deviation from symmetry about the origin
will cause the probability to fall.
An easily understood, partial corroboration of the finding comes
from considering an interval confined to the negative real axis. The
symmetry about the origin of the probability density, f Z zð Þ, means
that the maximum probability such an interval can generate is 50%.
A similar conclusion is reached when the interval is limited to the
positive real axis. It is thus immediately clear that the probabilities
normally of interest, 90%, 95% or 99%, can be produced only by an
interval that straddles the origin. The fuller analysis above shows
that the maximum probability will occur when the interval not
only straddles the origin but is symmetrical about it.C.2. Minimising the length of the interval containing, with any
specified probability, the population fraction, p
Consider a general interval, h; kð Þ, of length, k h, which has a
probability, hh;k, of including G X;n; pð Þ: P h  G X;n; pð Þ  kð Þ ¼ hh;k.
By the result of Section C.1, that probability will be maximised
for intervals of the same length, k h, when the interval straddles
the origin symmetrically, in which case the interval is j;jð Þ,
where
j ¼ k h
2
ðC:22Þ
The interval length is now 2j. From Eqs. (B.4) and (B.2)
P j  G X;n;pð Þ  jð Þ ¼ hj;j ¼
Z j
j
f Z zð Þdz ðC:23Þ
This probability may be compared with the case considered in
the previous Section, where the interval was b; bð Þ, of length 2b:
P b  G X;n; pð Þ  bð Þ ¼ hb;b ¼
Z b
b
f Z zð Þdz ðC:24Þ
If j < b, Eq. (C.24) may be written:
hb;b ¼
R j
b f Z zð Þdzþ
R j
j f Z zð Þdzþ
R b
j f Z zð Þdz
¼ hj;j þ
Rj
b f Z zð Þdzþ
R b
j f Z zð Þdz
ðC:25Þ
Since f Z zð Þ > 0 for all z and, in particular, for b  z  j and
j  z  b, it follows that
hb;b > hj;j if j < b ðC:26Þ
Furthermore, the probability associated with an interval that
located symmetrically about the origin will be greater than that
produced by any other interval of the same length:
hj;j > hh;k for h; kð Þ– j;jð Þ ðC:27Þ
It follows from the conjunction of conditions (C.26) and (C.27)
that:
hb;b > hh;k when k h < 2b ðC:28Þ
Condition (C.28) shows that the probability generated by an
interval that is symmetrical about the origin is greater than that
associated with any interval, wherever it occurs on the real axis,
if that second interval is shorter.
Hence for any specified probability of containing G X;n; pð Þ, the
length of the interval will be minimised by selecting the
probability-compliant interval that straddles the origin symmetri-
cally. By the same token, the interval will straddle E Gð Þ symmetri-
cally, as E Gð Þ ¼ 0 by Eq. (B.6).
Appendix D. Confidence interval for a general population
average
Referring to Appendix B, the random number, X=n, may be
regarded as the average, Y

, of n independent trials of a Bernoulli
process in each of which the random variable, Y, takes the value,
1, with probability, p, and 0 with probability, 1 – p. Meanwhile
the true mean of the Bernoulli process is given by
l ¼ E Yð Þ ¼ p 1þ 1 pð Þ  0 ¼ p ðD:1Þ
and the standard deviation by:
r ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var Yð Þ
p
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
E Y2
 	
 E Yð Þð Þ2
r
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 12 þ 1 pð Þ  02  p2
q
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
p
ðD:2Þ
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lim
n!1
P a  Y

l
r=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p  b
 !
¼ U bð Þ U að Þ ðD:3Þ
which is a statement of the Central Limit Theorem [53], which has
general application to averages from a wide variety of distributions,
including those applying to a continuous parameter.
Taking the case of a continuous parameter, putting a ¼ b to
give the shortest interval and allowing for a finite but large num-
ber, n, of samples gives the approximate equality:
P b  Y

l
r=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p  b
 !
 2U bð Þ  1 ðD:4Þ
so that
P Y

b rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p  l  Y

þb rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
 
 2U bð Þ  1 ðD:5Þ
For example b ¼ 1:96 gives
P Y

1:96 rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p  l  Y

þ1:96 rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
 
 0:95 ðD:6Þ
By the analysis of Appendix C, the length of the interval cited in
Eq. (D.5), 2b bð Þ rﬃﬃnp , is the shortest that can offer a b% probability of
containing the population average, l. To fulfil this probability,
the interval needs to be centred on Y

, the expected value of which
is given by: E Y
 	
¼ l.
The b% confidence interval is centred on the actual sample aver-
age, y

:
y
b bð Þ rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ; yþb bð Þ rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
 
ðD:7Þ
when the standard deviation, r, is known. This interval is a realisa-
tion of the random interval set down in Eq. (D.5).
Each of the terms in expression (D.7) is deterministic, a reflec-
tion of the fact that the uncertainty has disappeared, so that the
interval is deterministic and no longer random. Therefore the prob-
ability operator, P :ð Þ, ceases to have meaning and it cannot be
claimed that the interval described in expression (D.7) has a prob-
ability, b, of containing the population average, l. However, refer-
ence may be made to the provenance of the deterministic interval,
namely that it resulted from a process that obeyed Eq. (D.5), that is
to say a process that had a probability, b, of capturing the mean
within the interval. The term, ‘‘confidence”, can be ascribed to this
prior probability. Furthermore, uncertainty could be re-introduced
into the overall system of measurement by repeating the estima-
tion process many times using different samples, and then allow-
ing the measurer to choose at random just one of the resultant
different realisations of the interval. A fraction,  b, of the intervals
so produced, will contain the true mean, l, so that the probability
of choosing an interval containing the true mean will be  b (an
infinite number of realisations would be needed to render the
probability exactly equal to b). The sample average, as seen by
the selector, will now be random again, so that Eq. (D.5) applies
once more. The term, ‘‘confidence”, can also ascribed to this ‘‘pos-
terior” probability.
The length of the b % confidence interval can be found by sub-
tracting the first from the second term in expression (D.7):
w ¼ 2b bð Þ rﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðD:8ÞThis is clearly the same length as the probability interval given
in Eq. (D.5), and is thus the shortest length, measured in the units
of the average value, l, that can offer a b% probability of containing
l.
The relative length, k bð Þ, of the b% confidence interval may be
found by dividing by the population average, l:
k bð Þ ¼ 2b bð Þ r
l
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðD:9Þ
k bð Þ is given the name, ‘‘b-level precision”, in this paper (see
Section 4.1).
Appendix E. Incorporating a multiplier into the Utility Model:
the Extended Utility Model
To allow for variations between the responses of individuals
with similar levels of wealth, an additional multiplier, R, may be
applied to the VPF, V, derived in Section 3.1, so as to produce a
modified VPF, Vm:
Vm ¼ RV ðE:1Þ
(cf. Eq. (12)). The Extended Utility Model is designed to produce the
same expected value as the standard Utility Model, viz.
E Vmð Þ ¼ E Vð Þ ðE:2Þ
The inclusion of the multiplier into the model follows the gen-
eral mathematical development of Section 3.2. Thus the multiplier,
R, will have the form given in Eq. (13), the probability density func-
tion, f Q qð Þ, for Qwill be as given in Eq. (14), and the expected value
of the multiplier will correspond to Eq. (15).
As R and V are modelled as independent, the expected value of
their product is simply the product of their expected values:
E Vmð Þ ¼ E Rð ÞE Vð Þ ðE:3Þ
Substituting Eq. (E.2) into Eq. (E.3) means that
E Rð Þ ¼ 1 ðE:4Þ
Combining Eqs. (E.4) and (15) gives the relationship between
the interval length, s, and the deterministic component, r0, of the
multiplier:
s ¼ 2 1 r0ð Þ ðE:5Þ
The constraint that s  0 means that the smallest value of s,
namely zero, occurs when
r0 ¼ 1 ¼ r0max ¼ E Rð Þ ðE:6Þ
Conversely,
s ¼ smax ¼ 2when r0 ¼ 0 ¼ r0min ðE:7Þ
The variance of R is given by Eq. (20): var Rð Þ ¼ s2=12.
The variance of Vm is the variance of the product of the two
independent random variables, R and V, which may be written
[52]:
var Vmð Þ ¼ var RVð Þ ¼ var Rð Þvar Vð Þ þ E Vð Þð Þ2var Rð Þ þ E Rð Þð Þ2var Vð Þ
ðE:8Þ
(cf. Eq. (22)).
For the Extended Utility Model, the minimum sample size,
nVmmin, under the 12% rule may be found by replacing V by Vm in
Eq. (30) and using inequality (29) so that
nVmmin ¼
var Vmð Þ
E Vmð Þð Þ2
3:92
0:12
 2
ðE:9Þ
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Fig. 12. Minimum sample size, nVmmin, under the 12% rule for the Extended Utility
Model for VPF survey, for the Utility Model and for the Multiplier Model.
P. Thomas /Measurement 150 (2020) 107044 19Eq. (E.9) may be evaluated for nVmmin as the deterministic com-
ponent, r0, varies between r0 ¼ r0min ¼ 0 and r0 ¼ r0max ¼ 1. It is
found that
2648  nVmmin  3887 ðE:10Þ
and that the middle of the range for r0 gives a value of nVmmin that is
just below 3000.
Fig. 12 plots the minimum sample size for the Extended Utility
Model, nVmmin, against the ratio r0=r0max. This allows the results for
the Utility Model and the Multiplier Model to be presented on the
same graph. (In the case of the Extended Utility Model, r0max ¼ 1
and so r0=r0max ¼ r0).
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